I. INTRODUCTION
In Cooper v. Oklahoma,' the United States Supreme Court exa-mined whether a state could require a defendant to prove his incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence. 2 Though the Court had already upheld one state statute that required a defendant to prove his incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence," s Cooper held that the heightened "clear and convincing evidence" standard was an impermissible violation of a defendant's fundamental right under the Due Process Clause not to be tried while incompetent because it greatly increased the potential for an erroneous decision. 4 The Court relied on a two-part argument, first looking at historical precedent and then examining whether Oklahoma's rule exhibited "fundamental fairness in practice." 5 This Note argues that the Supreme Court was correct to strike down Oklahoma's heightened statutory requirement for proof of incompetence. By setting such a high standard, Oklahoma virtually guaranteed that its courts would convict many defendants who were more likely than not incompetent. This result would have been contrary to due process and had no rational justification.
II. BACKGROUND
Incompetency is a mental disability that impairs a defendant to the extent that he cannot grasp the nature of the charges against him nor assist counsel in his defense. 6 Because such an impairment could jeopardize a defendant's opportunity to receive a fair trial, the Supreme Court has long held that the trial and conviction of an in-12 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). 13 Id (internal quotations omitted). The Solicitor General actually suggested this test in his brief to the Court. See id.
14 3883 U.S. 375 (1966) .
!d at 378.
16 While the Supreme Court had not yet formally considered the appropriate evidentiary standard, there is a long history of application of the "preponderance of the evidence" requirement for a defendant raising the claim of incompetence in both English courts and lower American courts. Early English cases did not provide a specific standard, butjudges' instructions tended to use disjunctive language, calling for a determination of whether or not the defendant was incompetent. Patterson v. New York,' 7 which dealt with raising an affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the Court discussed the evidentiary burden defendants must meet in order to prevail.' 8 Justice White, writing for the majority, relied on Leland v. Oregon' 9 and Rivera v. Delaware 2 0 for the proposition that the appropriate standard necessary to raise an affirmative defense of insanity was "a preponderance of evidence." 2 ' Because this case dealt with insanity, however, significant questions still existed as to the constitutionally required standard of proof for incompetence.
Two years later, the Court addressed the appropriate standards for competency in Addington v. Texas, 22 where the issue arose in the context of a civil proceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental hospital. 2 3 The Court, per Justice Burger, held that "the individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than...
[a] preponderance of the evidence." 24 The Court remanded the case back to the lower court with the suggestion that the proper standard should be something "equal to or greater than the clear and convincing standard which...
is required to meet due process guarantees." 2 5 The Court distinguished civil commitment proceedings from criminal prosecutions, noting that different standards were both appropriate and necessary.
2 6 In justifying the distinction, Justice Burger emphasized that a 307 (1790). A more modem English case cited earlier authority for the proposition that the appropriate evidentiary standard was a preponderance of evidence. Queen v. Podola, 43 Crim. App. 220 (1959 was the proper method to analyze the burden of proof standard for competency. 3 3 Mathews dealt with a challenge on due process grounds to administrative procedures for termination of Social Security disability payments, and the Mathews Court adopted a three-part balancing test for assessing due process claims. Justice Kennedy rejected the Mathews balancing test as the appropriate way to determine requirements in a criminal procedural case.
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For criminal cases, Justice Kennedy instead adopted the more "narrow" due process test used in Patterson v. New York in the context of a defendant's burden in proving extreme emotional disturbance. Under this test, a state's regulating procedures are not subject to due process regulation unless they offend a fundamental principle of justice.
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Justice Kennedy then undertook both a historical and operational analysis, ultimately concluding that placing the burden of proof on a criminal defendant to establish his incompetence by a prepon- 443 (1992) . 34 The test for analyzing a procedural due process claim involves assessing (1) "the private interest that will be affected by the official action," (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 63 The psychologist believed that Cooper was not mentally ill, and was both fully aware of the nature of the charges against him and capable of assisting his attorney.
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The next dispute over Cooper's competency arose over a year later during a motion hearing. 65 Cooper's counsel informed the court that the defendant had displayed unusual behavior in the courtroom and county jail. 6 6 Investigators from the Public Defender's Office who had spent a great deal of time with Cooper observed that he was "cracking up." 67 Still, the trial judge declined to change his previous ruling. Trial began on May 4, 1992, at which time Cooper displayed visibly abnormal courtroom behavior. 69 To begin with, Cooper resisted changing into his court clothes because they "burned" him.
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Cooper's attorney then requested another competency evaluation and, as he was speaking, Cooper crouched in a fetal position. 7 1 When Cooper took the stand to testify during the competency hearing, he stated that his lawyer was trying to kill him, his mother had died a long time ago (when in fact she had testified in that very courtroom several days earlier), and he thought he had already been acquitted of the murder charge.
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The most bizarre portion of Cooper's testimony concerned the existence of "Noryb," a spirit with whom Cooper supposedly communicated. 73 During testimony about Noryb, Cooper's attorney approached the witness box. 74 Apparently out of fear that his lawyer was trying to kill him, Cooper became so agitated that he fell backwards out of his chair and over the railing, hitting his head forcefully against the courtroom wall. 75 Later in the hearing, five of Cooper's fellow inmates testified about his strange behavior, stating that in recent weeks Cooper had cleaned his jail cell as often as ten times a day, talked to himself constantly, and repeatedly handled feces-swirling his hand in his unflushed toilet and rubbing it on his face. 7 7 Cooper's counsel also produced the expert testimony of Dr. Philip Murphy, who stated that Cooper suffered from a severe, episodic affective disorder. 78 The prosecution countered with testimony from three prison officials who had not observed any irrational behavior in Cooper in recent weeks.
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After hearing this evidence, the trial court again refused to rule Cooper incompetent to stand trial°8 0 The judge noted Dr. Murphy's credibility and the presence of a significant question as to Cooper's mental health. 8 1 Nonetheless, the trial judge ultimately concluded that in his opinion, Cooper failed to meet his burden of proving incompetency by "clear and convincing evidence." 8 2 72 Id at 5. 73 Id. at 6. During the trial, Cooper did not interact with his attorney. 8 3 Instead, he either slept, talked to himself, or curled up in a fetal position in the comer of the courtroom. 84 A defense investigator testified that he was unable to help Cooper with his case because the defendant refused to speak to him: "I go up to talk to [Cooper] ... and I get nothing. His pants are on fire, our office is trying to kill him, nothing to help me with his case, nothing that I can use. Nothing .... I get nothing from him." 8 5 Cooper's behavior forced the court to address his competency yet again as the prosecution wrapped up its presentation of evidence. 8 6 This time, the court bailiff and deputy observed Cooper eating feces that he had collected in his hand. 8 7 Again, however, the judge denied a reevaluation of Cooper's competency. 88 After the jury found Cooper guilty, Cooper's counsel presented additional evidence regarding the defendant's mental condition at the sentencing hearings. 89 His counsel outlined a history of extreme mental and physical abuse: Cooper's mother was an alcoholic who suffered from schizophrenia; Cooper was without adult supervision as a child and often lived without food, water, gas, or electricity; Cooper's mother beat him with her fists as well as a hammer, a baseball bat, brooms, and electric cords, once even firing a gun at him; Cooper was placed in a foster home at an early age and often spent the night in an outdoor geese pen or locked in a closet with a pot to urinate in; Cooper later went to a state facility where the administrators lied and told him that his parents had been killed; when Cooper was eleven, his mother shot and killed her husband and forced Cooper to bring money into the house by stealing; and, finally, Cooper was sexually abused in prison at the age of eighteen. 90 90 Id. at 11-12. A developmental psychologist testified that Cooper's history was among the worst she had seen in over twenty years of practice. Id at 12.
91 Id. at 13. The jury recommended the death penalty because of five aggravating circumstances: (1) previous conviction for a violent felony; (2) committing murder to avoid arrest or prosecution; (3) an especially heinous murder; (4) committing murder while serving a prison term; and (5) Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens overruled the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, holding that the "clear and convincing" evidentiary burden on a defendant to prove his incompetence "is incompatible with the dictates of due process." 9 5 The bulk of Justice Stevens' decision consisted of a historical analysis of cases in which courts refused to try incompetent defendants. 96 He concluded by holding that a clear and convincing standard for proof of incompetency violates due process by placing too high a burden on a defendant to demonstrate his incompetency and hence depriving his fundamental right to a fair trial. Justice Stevens began his analysis by noting the general, longstanding recognition by the Supreme Court that "the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process." 98 He then noted a well-established standard for incompetence: a defendant must (1) be able to consult rationally with his counsel and (2) have some basic conceptual understanding of the charges against him. 9 9
The Court next examined the recent case of Medina v. California' 00 for support, commenting that Medina allows a state to require proof of incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence."' 0 ' Justice Stevens emphasized that Medina's holding was relatively narrow, applicable only in those cases where the evidence for and against in- Justice Stevens then began the core of his argument, a historical overview of the standard required to prove a defendant's incompetency. 10 5 He noted at the outset that Oklahoma's "clear and convincing evidence" requirement was without any apparent precedent. Justice Stevens also observed that the general rule against trying an incompetent defendant traced back to Hale and Blackstone, and that the first cases supporting this notion appeared in the late 1700s. In tracing the development of the preponderance standard, Justice Stevens examined a series of English cases from the 18th and early 19th centuries in which the judge instructed the jury to determine whether or not the defendant was competent to stand trial.108 Justice Stevens then noted that a modem English case, Queen v. Podola, 0 9 relied upon the precedent of these earlier decisions to explicitly apply the preponderance standard for incompetence. 11 0 Justice Stevens next turned to American precedent, noting that early American cases relied upon the English standard."' As Justice Stevens noted, by 1896, judges explicitly instructed juries that a defendant must prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence." 2 Justice Stevens then surveyed modem practice, noting that only four states require a defendant to prove his incompetence by clear 102 Id. In that sense, the Medina Court was not substantially increasing the risk of incompetent defendants facing trial because the rule only affected a narrow class of cases.
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Id. 104 
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Stevens later wrote that
Oklahoma's practice of requiring the defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence imposes a significant risk of an erroneous determination that the defendant is competent. In Medina we found no comparable risk because the presumption would affect only the narrow class of cases in which the evidence on either side was equally balanced. and convincing evidence.' 1 3 Furthermore, Justice Stevens noted that "a number of States place no burden on the defendant at all, but rather require the prosecutor to prove the defendant's competence."" 4 The Court also looked to the federal courts, observing that Congress adopted a preponderance of evidence standard for proof of incompetence under 18 U.S.C. § 4241.115 Justice Stevens concluded his historical analysis with the observation that a clear and convincing standard "offends a principle of justice that is deeply 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people."116 Justice Stevens next addressed whether the Oklahoma standard was "fundamentally fair."" 7 He observed that Oklahoma, in setting such a high standard for proof of incompetency, greatly increased the likelihood of an erroneous finding of competency." 8 To Justice Stevens, the most egregious aspect of Oklahoma's heightened standard was that a court may artificially find "competent" a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent." 9 Because a defendant who is more likely than not incompetent may be unable to effectively communicate with counsel nor understand the charges against him, he will not receive a fair trial.' 2 0 Significantly, Justice Stevens concluded that the risk to the state of erroneously finding the defendant incompetent posed a comparatively "modest" harm.' 2 1 Justice Stevens concluded this section with the observation that in cases where the defendant is more likely than not incompetent but does not quite meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence, the defendant's "fundamental right to be tried only while competent outweighs the State's interest in the efficient operation of its criminal justice system.' u 22
Finally, the Court examined and rejected Oklahoma's two additional arguments in support of its clear and convincing evidence stan- 125 However, Justice Stevens observed that Patterson also subjected a state to review in instances where its regulation of procedural burdens upsets a fundamental principle of justice. 126 Second, Oklahoma argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Addington v. Texas,1 27 which requires a clear and convincing standard of proof in an involuntary civil commitment proceeding, supports the argument that this standard should apply to competency hearings as well. 128 Justice Stevens quickly dispatched with this contention by noting that competency and commitment proceedings are highly dissimilar.129 He also pointed out that the Addington ruling in fact protected the same interest, "the proper protection of fundamental rights in circumstances in which the State proposes to take drastic action against an individual."' 0 Justice Stevens concluded by re-emphasizing that, in requiring such a heightened standard of evidence for incompetency, Oklahoma allowed a defendant who was "more likely than not incompetent" to stand trial.'31 By permitting this to take place, Oklahoma's statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.' 
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision is both appropriate and well crafted. In Part A, this Note observes that the lower court's opinion was based largely on faulty logic and did not deserve to stand. Part B finds that the Court correctly argued that case precedent supports a preponderance of evidence standard for proof of incompetence. In Part C, this Note supports the Court's rejection of Oklahoma's state interest claim on the grounds that the individual defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial outweighs any interest the State may have in a speedy judicial process. Finally, in Part D, this Note examines the potential impact of Cooper, finding that it appears to provide grounds for appeal by defendants ruled incompetent under the clear and convincing standard.
A. THE LOWER COURT USED FAULTY REASONING IN UPHOLDING THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals used severely flawed logic in upholding the clear and convincing evidence standard. To begin with, the court correctly noted that "in criminal cases, the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that they... [require] standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. " '" Yet this is the very reason that a clear and convincing standard cannot stand, for it imposes an unreasonably high burden on the defendant. It is not only likely but probable that a court will erroneously judge a defendant competent when he is in fact more likely than not incompetent, simply because he does not meet the heightened standard.
A related flaw in the lower court's opinion concerned Oklahoma's argument that its interest in a speedy trial necessitated a higher standard of proof for incompetence. s5 In accepting this argument, the lower court correctly observed that the determination of incompetency was prone to "inexactness and uncertainty... based on diagnoses which are... [largely] drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through.., the diagnostician." 186 However, in the same paragraph, the court justified imposing a clear and convincing evidence standard since "[a] truly incompetent criminal defendant, through his attorneys and experts, can prove incompetency with relative ease."' 3 7
The lower court was correct in asserting that incompetency pro- internal quotations omitted) ).
137 Id. ceedings are uncertain and based to a large extent on subjective evaluations. Indeed, this is the very reason why the standard for incompetency should not be as high as clear and convincing evidence, for such a level of proof would be nearly impossible to meet. It is absurd to suggest that a "truly incompetent" defendant can easily meet this higher standard of evidence in an age where psychological "experts" are readily available to the defense and prosecution. The lower court was so eager to uphold its statute on the basis of the State's interest in a speedy trial that it did not even formulate a cohesive argument.
The injustice of this clear and convincing evidentiary standard is especially clear from the particular facts of Cooper. Despite the lower court finding no evidence that Cooper was incompetent during the trial,1an even a cursory reading of the facts of the case suggests that there was ample evidence to find Cooper more likely than not incompetent. Expert testimony was sharply divided, and in light of this balance, the scales certainly should have tipped in favor of Cooper's incompetence in light of his bizarre actions in court and in jail, his inability to communicate with counsel or investigators, and his grisly history of past abuse (which, although not entirely relevant to prove his incompetency at the time of trial, nonetheless lent a credible backdrop to the argument that he was currently mentally disabled). The lower court's upholding of the conviction of a man who ate his own feces in court, thought his attorney was a devil, and crouched in a fetal position during a significant portion of his trial, was a grievous and excessive violation of a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.
B. CASE HISTORY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
While the Supreme Court did not cohesively analyze the appropriate burden of proof in an incompetence hearing until Medina, Justice Stevens correctly observed that all relevant case history from other courts points to a preponderance of evidence standard for a defendant to prove his incompetence. 13 9 It is unmistakably clear from a survey of early English and American cases that the common law 188 Id. at 304. The Court of Criminal Appeals went on to state that the record was "brimming with evidence" that Cooper was malingering. Id. at 313. 139 It is important to note that there are many cases "irrelevant" to this discussion that involve placing the burden on the state to demonstrate incompetence by a preponderance of evidence. As of 1995, Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, NewJersey, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin all placed the burden of proof on the prosecution to prove incompetence, and this was reflected in the relevant case law. to speculate that these cases suggest an instruction of finding the defendant "more likely than not" incompetent by "phrasing the inquiry in a simple disjunctive."' 4 6 Although it is certainly true that the use of "whether ... or not" in the instructions from these cases indicates that the jury was required to balance the evidence for and against incompetence, it is by no means certain that this entailed a determination of whether the defendant was "more likely than not" incompetent. 47 Justice Stevens placed a better theory regarding the earlier English cases in a footnote, noting that because there was a great deal of disagreement among the courts regarding which party had to prove the defendant's incompetence, "it is unlikely that in cases in which the burden was placed on the defendant that burden was as weighty as clear and convincing evidence." 48 This is a more reasonable inference, as it is certainly unlikely that if there was no set standard among the English courts a requirement as high as clear and convincing evidence could take hold.
Once Justice Stevens begins to cite English and American cases from the twentieth century, it becomes clear that there is simply no precedent for a clear and convincing evidentiary requirement. Courts explicitly adopted the preponderance of evidence standard at the turn of the century. The cases Justice Stevens discusses are by no means the only examples. Early American case history abounds with application of the preponderance of evidence test for proving incompetence at the time of trial. As early as 1901, the Supreme Court of Arkansas explicitly adopted the preponderance standard in ruling on a case in which the defendant could not fully understand the nature of the charges against him because of the cumulative effects of extensive morphine usage. 1 53 Ten years later, the Supreme Court of South Carolina considered a case in which the defendant had apparently become insane since conviction, and held that "[tihe plea of [present] insanity is an affirmative defense, and must be established by the party interposing it by the preponderance of evidence." 59 with the observation that, in, determining present incompetence to stand trial, "we are confronted with the presumption of law that every man is presumed to be sane until the contrary is proven by a preponderance of evidence." 160 Over twenty years later, the Supreme Court of Iowa, in State v. Bruntlett, 16 1 mirrored this analysis with the comment that "[t] he burden of proof is upon appellant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence a claimed plea of insanity" at the time of trial.162
In light of this long history of requiring a defendant to prove his incompetence to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence, Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence requirement is not credible. There is simply no precedent for this heightened standard.
C. OKLAHOMA'S STATE INTEREST ARGUMENT MUST BE REJECTED

BECAUSE OF THE GREATER INTEREST OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Oklahoma's most compelling argument for the heightened standard is that, under the federalist system, it is the State's function to establish guidelines for its criminal justice system. 163 Hence, because of Oklahoma's strong interest in a speedy judicial process, the clear and convincing evidence requirement must stand. 6 4 Essentially, Oklahoma argued that an erroneous determination of competency would indefinitely postpone a trial from taking place, which would work to the defendant's advantage and burden the state's resources. 16 5 Interestingly, fifteen states supported Oklahoma's right to establish this heightened burden of proof in an amicus brief to the Court. However, while a state normally has the power to regulate internal procedures, including the burden of proof, such regulations may be scrutinized and overturned if they offend "some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental." 6 7 Thus, Justice Stevens correctly asserted that while Oklahoma did have the right to determine its criminal burdens and procedures, the clear and convincing evidence standard that it imposed violated a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial.168 163 170 There, the Court considered the appropriate burden of proof when the guardians of an incompetent person on life-support seek to terminate her life.171 Missouri required that the guardians demonstrate the incompetent's wishes by clear and convincing evidence, and the Court upheld this heightened standard by weighing the interest in the "protection and preservation of human life" against mistakenly terminating the surrogate's life. 172 More specifically, making the incorrect decision not to terminate the patient's life would lead to "a maintenance of the status quo" and possible new developments in medicine and science, while incorrectly stopping life support "is not susceptible of correction." 173 In making its ruling, the Court observed that " [t ] he more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision." 174 By requiring a defendant to prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence, Oklahoma increased the likelihood of an erroneous finding of competency.
In The Supreme Court has imposed a clear and convincing evidence requirement where it is necessary to protect an individual's fundamental rights. The Court has long held that in criminal cases it is far worse to convict an innocent party than to let a guilty party go free.
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Applied to the context of incompetency, imposing a clear and convincing evidence requirement on a defendant substantially increases the likelihood that a court will erroneously convict a defendant who is mentally incompetent. In fact, under the Oklahoma standard, a court may convict and punish a defendant who demonstrates that he is more likely than not incompetent. In Cooper, the Oklahoma court was prepared to execute a defendant who provided ample evidence of incompetence at trial. This is unquestionably an abridgment of the individual's fundamental right to a fair trial. Hence, the interest of the state in a speedy prosecution is outweighed by the defendant's fundamental interest in not being tried while incompetent, as well as the fact that an erroneous finding of incompetence simply means that the defendant will be institutionalized until found sane to stand trial.
D. THE IMPAc OF COOPER
The most immediate effect of Cooper was that Oklahoma almost immediately revised its statute, changing the language "clear and convincing" to "preponderance of the evidence." 9 3 It appears that at to believe that prisoners in Oklahoma, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania who were found incompetent at trial will now have grounds for appeal. 195 In Oklahoma, one possible limitation is the requirement that a retrospective competency determination can only take place if credible evidence still exists. 19 6 It is not clear whether this requirement will conflict with Oklahoma's change in statutory language. Certainly it is possible that where credible evidence such as witnesses and testimony no longer exists, the case may simply be remanded and re-tried, as occurred after the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper.
In addition to changing its statute to reflect a preponderance of evidence standard, Oklahoma courts have quickly accepted the Supreme Court's ruling. In October, 1996, Roderick Smith, sentenced to death by the District Court of Oklahoma County, appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals. 197 One ground for his appeal was that Oklahoma's clear and convincing evidence standard was unconstitutional, and the court, relying on Cooper, agreed that this standard violated due process. 198 However, the court of appeals did not remand the case because the facts clearly indicated that "[tihe defense failed to prove, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Smith] was incompetent to stand trial." 199 While this case does not speak directly to an appeal based on conviction under the old statute, it does demonstrate the court's ready acceptance of Cooper.
More significantly, the Tenth Circuit has implicitly acknowledged that defendants convicted under Oklahoma's unconstitutional clear and convincing evidence standard will be able to appeal their convictions. In August, 1996, the court considered the claim of Steven Hatch, a defendant sentenced to death who filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. By amending its statute to a preponderance of the evidence standard for incompetence, readily accepting Cooper in its courts within several months of the Supreme Court's decision, and implicitly holding that a defendant convicted under the unconstitutional standard will have grounds for appeal, Oklahoma appears more than willing to consider appeals from convicts found competent under the old standard. In Cooper v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court found that Oklahoma's requirement that a defendant prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence violated Due Process by depriving the defendant of his fundamental right to a fair trial. This holding is wholly consistent with the history of incompetency cases in England and America, which demonstrates consistent application of a preponderance of evidence standard until recently. The only flaw in the Court's decision was its reliance on the language of very early cases as proof of the preponderance standard. Notwithstanding this minor glitch, it is eminently clear that placing a clear and convincing requirement on the defendant has no foundation. Such a standard deprives a defendant of his fundamental right to be competent at trial, enabling an Oklahoma court to convict and punish a defendant who is unable to 201 Id. at 1015.
Id. (emphasis added).
203 "Unlike Mr. Cooper, who was forced to prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence, the statutory scheme under which Hatch was found competent simply called for a medical determination by state doctors whether the defendant was 'presently sane' or 'presently insane.'" Id. (citations omitted).
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205 There are several decisions from the past few years where a defendant found competent under the clear and convincing evidence standard may be able to make a successful appeal. In Valdez v. Oklahoma, for example, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a death sentence for a defendant found incompetent under the old standard, noting that "the trial court's finding of competence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. An accused at the post-examination competency hearing is presumed competent and thus bears the burden of proving incompetence by clear and convincing evidence." Valdez v. Oklahoma, 900 P.2d 363, 367, 369 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
